Members,
The United States Congress
President
Barack
Obama
1400
Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
March
22, 2009
Dear
Mr.
President,
We
members of Congress are encouraged by your recognition that the war in
Afghanistan will not be won by military means alone.
As your State Department spokesman Robert
Wood said soon after you took office, "There is no purely military
solution to the challenge in Afghanistan so there will be a significant
non-military component to anything that we seek to undertake." It has long been clear to many that
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance must play a key part in
defeating
the Taliban insurgency. We would like to
put forth a plan to you which recognizes the urgency of the
deteriorating
situation: an emergency, cash-for-day-labor jobs program, which puts
money into
the hands of desperate Afghans immediately, who will otherwise be
tempted to
join the Taliban before this year’s spring offensive.
As the snows melt in the mountain passes and
the Taliban's favored fighting weather approaches, we are concerned
that the
cash wage paid by the Taliban to young fighters, estimated at $8 to $10
per
day, or in other estimates about $150 per month, will continue to swell
the
ranks of the Taliban. Vice President Joe
Biden said recently in Brussels that 70 percent of the Taliban "are
involved because of the money, because they are getting paid." As you are aware, Afghanistan has been
suffering from 40-50 percent unemployment and an utterly failed
reconstruction. Dr. Barnett Rubin, a
member of the Afghanistan Study Group constituted under your
predecessor, has
said that after being driven into Pakistan's tribal areas in late 2001,
the
Taliban "reconstituted their command structure, recruitment networks,
and
support bases ... while Afghans waited in vain for the major
reconstruction
effort they expected to build their state and improve their lives".
The
charitable organization Oxfam, which is at the center of the NGO
community
involved in the reconstruction, warned in January of this year that the
country
is now sliding into a "major humanitarian crisis" which could
undermine significant peace initiatives now underway between major
Taliban
factions and the Karzai government.
Oxfam America said, in a letter addressed to you:
"Events have reached a critical
juncture in Afghanistan and conditions could deteriorate further unless
the
United States takes a lead in addressing failures in governance, aid
and
reconstruction...A humanitarian crisis, affecting large parts of
Afghanistan,
is emerging...many Afghans are facing some of the worst conditions they
have
experienced in twenty years. In Khers
Khana village in Ashterlai...with no nearby health clinic and
widespread
malnutrition, eight children from the village died over the last year
from
preventable diseases. Families in Dakundi and all over Afghanistan are
being
forced to take exceptional measures to support their families such as
selling
their animals..."
We
the undersigned include both supporters and critics of the 17,000 troop
surge. We can agree, however, that the
exact number of troops is not as important as what they are doing there. As a result of the misfortune of thirty years
of war, privation, and military occupation, history has many lessons to
offer. An officer for the most recent
occupier before us, retired Russian General Pavel Grachev, said in a
March 9,
2009 newspaper report entitled "Russian advice on Afghanistan: build
roads, don't drop bombs":
"I believed as sincerely as American officers do now that we
were
fighting there to help make our country safer," said Grachev, who later
became defense minister and sent in Russian units to quell Chechnya
during the
1990s, a campaign that also ended in disaster. "After the war, as a
politician, I could see this war had been pointless."
That said, Grachev offered some advice: Post
soldiers to guard road projects and irrigation systems, and send in an
army of
engineers, doctors, mining experts and construction advisers. Pouring billions of dollars into
infrastructure would be a lot more productive than firefights in
far-flung
villages, he said."
Our
feeling is that the nature of our
occupation is as important as its duration and magnitude.
We
know that your administration is going in the right direction in its
policy
toward Afghanistan. Our concern is whether
real help is getting to poor Afghans fast enough, and on a large enough
scale,
to avert the tide turning toward the Taliban.
It is a short-term plan for job-creation on a large scale which
we now
put before you. Developing bids for
reconstruction projects, putting them out, and evaluating them takes
time. But Afghans are hungry and
desperate, and
need jobs and a sense of participation in building their country, right
now.
We
urge you, Mr. President, to immediately
implement a program, well within reach of the discretionary funding
mechanisms
at your disposal at various executive branch agencies such as USAID, to
create
750,000 day labor jobs in Afghanistan at the base pay of $10 per day,
by June
1, 2009. This is a wage which would
compete effectively with the Taliban.
Funds such as this are already being administered by the State
Department’s Bureau for Populations, Refugees and Migration, which has
contracted
with NGOs such as Caritas and Catholic Relief Services for projects
such as
clearing canals and irrigation systems in eight villages in Maiwand and
Panjwai
districts in the province of Kandahar, hiring day labor which provides
poor
Afghans with much-needed income. There
is no shortage of work like this to be done in any province in the
country. After 30 years of war,
Afghanistan's rural infrastructure is nearly non-existent, even after 8
years
of NATO occupation. Much of the basic
water transportation infrastructure was destroyed in the war with the
former
Union of Soviet Republics, by bombing, and rubble now blocks many
canals and
irrigation waterways. The water problem
is paramount in Afghanistan, with one out of four infants dying due to
preventable disease caused mostly by lack of clean drinking water. The food shortage is due in part to
traditional irrigation systems being useless and in disrepair.
Such
a program could be administered by a
combination of NGOs, U.S. military units, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams
(PRTs), and Afghan district and provincial authorities.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs has worked in partnership with Catholic Relief
Services
in the above-mentioned project in Kandahar, and oversaw the
distribution of
US$850,000 for the creation of 3,000 jobs.
A monitoring system could be implemented through the newly
passed
Special Inspector General for the Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR),
which
some of our colleagues worked hard for.
A
2009 RAND report prepared for the U.S.
Army, “Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability
Operations,”
of which Army Lt. Col. Jamie Gayton is a co-author, states:
"U.S. Army and other military personnel
should be aware…Some policies, like
short-term job-creation projects, are more effective during the initial
stages
of recovery…In contrast, larger-scale infrastructure projects are
usually
better suited for later stages after supply chains have been
reestablished and
local and national governments are in better shape to plan, contract,
and
manage major projects...“ (emphasis ours.)
Lt.
Col Gayton is the officer who met with
some success in Iraq with his reconstruction philosophy, in one of the
most
difficult places in Iraq, Sadr City.
The
American citizens' advocacy group,
Jobs for Afghans, has put forth an "Emergency Works Program" which
aims at hiring hundreds of thousands of Afghans for a daily cash wage
immediately, and this could provide one possible basis for an
employment program. The plan outlines:
*Focus on digging paths for
"pipeline" infrastructure with hand-tools, meaning thousands of miles
of trench which will carry basic water, electricity, and sewage
pipeline, which
is the foundation of rural infrastructure.
Pay a cash day wage of $10 per day, which is an excellent wage
in this
country.
*Prioritize Kabul's unsanitary
open-trench
sewage system, potential to hire thousands of workers in easy-to-secure
environment.
*Dovetail the Military Strategy, and
focus
the mission on using forces to protect work crews rather than chasing
Taliban
around the countryside, in order to minimize civilian casualties.
We
believe that the infusion of capital to
the poorest segment of society will jump-start the informal economy, as
Afghans
use funds to buy vendor stands, taxis, and other means of earning
income, and
distribute income through the tribal-clan structure to other Afghans. A $10 per day wage for work which will
require little in the way of capital equipment except work gloves and
hand
tools and will support not one, but two or three families in this
clan-based
society, and result in a "multiplier" effect well-known to
economists. We know that Afghans are
above all enterprising people. The main
reason Afghanistan has lapsed into major opium production is that many
small
farmers have no alternative to feeding their families, and the hardy
and
fast-growing crop is profitable.
Offering alternative livelihoods, as they have been promised for
years,
is the only meaningful way of putting a check on opium cultivation,
which is
mostly a small-scale enterprise.
In
closing we would like to stress that it
is many U.S. military commanders themselves who have perceptively
suggested
that the only way to stabilize Afghanistan is to address the economic
problem
as aggressively as we conduct offensive military operations. Former Commander of U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry, told a congressional committee in
2007: "Much
of the enemy force is drawn from the ranks of unemployed men looking
for wages
to support their families."
This
rare concurrence in analysis by a broad range of military and
civilian experts, we believe, clears the way to move aggressively on
the
program we describe. It is most
appropriate, of course, to close with the words of an Afghan, as these
are the
people who are fighting alongside us to secure our safety as well as
theirs. Noor Ahmed Qarqeen, Afghan
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, once said: "Men who work, have
no
time to make war."
We
members of Congress stand ready,
through the powers vested in us as United States senators and
congressmembers,
to help you make this vital prong in the multi-point attack on the
Afghan
insurgency a reality, before the window for peace and victory closes. Let your administration be the first to come
through with the promises we have been making to this embattled people
for far
too long.
Signed,
Ralph
Lopez for Jobs for Afghans
And
Members of the United States Congress:
Exhibits
Exhibit
A: Selected Quotations from News
Reports
Exhibit
B: Sources and Links
Exhibit
C: Powerpoint Presentation from Jobs
for Afghans
Exhibit
A: Selected Quotations from News
Reports
“Poverty
also fuels the fighting. Several
elders said the Taliban was offering upwards of 20,000 rupees ($360) a
month to
local unemployed men. Western officials are beginning to scrutinise the
source
of the funds.
Mr
Khan told the Guardian the militants
have bigger guns and more fighters. They have powerful friends. Several
times
he had collared Taliban fighters only to discover days later they had
been
released following a call from a powerful politician or influential
tribal
leader. They also have surprising amounts of money.
Last
year, he said, he captured two
insurgents, "one of them alive". Mr Khan asked him why he was
fighting. The man replied: "You are being paid 5,000 Afghanis ($110.) I
am
making 20,000 Pakistani rupees ($360.)
So now you tell me why you are fighting." --“Better
Paid, Better Armed, Better Connected - Taliban Rise Again,” UK
Guardian, Sept.
16, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/16/afghanistan.declanwalsh
“A
25-year-old man we will call Shakir has
told IRIN he rues rejecting an offer of “work” from a Taliban agent
whereby he
would get 500 Afghanis (about US$10) a day for carrying out attacks on
government offices in Farah Province, southwestern Afghanistan. Those who accepted the offer are better off,
he thinks. “People are jobless, hungry
and destitute so they agree to do anything for a small payment,” he
told IRIN,
refusing to give his name for fear the insurgents would kill him.”--“Afghanistan:
Tempted by a Taliban Job Offer,” IRIN News Agency, March 22,
2009
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83310
“Policemen
in Afghanistan are not happy with their lives. The highest-ranking
officer
makes about $80 per month, and "the Taliban pay better," one
policeman tells me. Would he go fight
with them? "They haven't asked me. But I have to survive. If they asked
me
I would," he replies.” --“Taliban
Threatens 'Grow Poppy or Die!,'”
Newsmax, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/11/16/162941.shtml?s=lh
“"These
insurgents are always on the
top of the mountains," says Kunar governor Fazlullah Wahidi. "Here smaller groups of command and
control people bring in specialised equipment and finances to pay very
poor and
uneducated people that live in the mountains to attack," he said.
This
includes an Al-Qaeda element from
mainly Arab countries who have had some form of training in Pakistan,
says Ostlund,
the most senior US military commander in Kunar.
"They
will sit on the hill and tell
the young fighters what to do and how to do it but few of them engage
in the
fighting themselves."
The
incentive for these fighters is cash,
he says. And the US government-funded trade school aims to help
"fighting-age males" to match, through legitimate jobs, the money
they would get from insurgent activity.
"We
need to pay construction workers
more than the Taliban are paying their soldiers, fighters and porters,"
says Ostlund, putting porters' pay at about 100 dollars a month and
fighters'
at 150.”
--“Afghans Learning a Better
Way to Match
Taliban Pay,” AFP, March 23, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hsVZExc0XaqQlfKcSpcweL5SbIuA
“Joining the Taleban gave
Mahmud a
chance to save up enough money to start his own small business.
Nowadays, he
buys goods in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah and sells them in the
districts at weekly "mila" or markets. "Now
that I have work, I am not with the
Taleban any more."” – “Few Choices for
Helmand’s Troubled
Youth,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Nov. 9, 2007
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=340496&apc_state=henh
"There is a low
percentage
of the total Taliban force who we would
call ideologically driven. We refer to them as Tier 1 people who believe their ideology, that what they're
doing is right. The vast majority of
Taliban fighters are essentially economically
disadvantaged young men."
--Col. Tom Collins, PBS Frontline, April 2,, 2007,
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/interview_collins.html
"Most Afghans, after the
dispersal of the Taliban, were full of hope and ready to work. The
tangible
benefits of reconstruction --jobs, housing, schools, health-care
facilities
--could have rallied them to support the goovernment and turn that
illusory
"democracy" into something like the real thing. But reconstruction
didn't happen." ---Journalist
Ann Jones, "The Road to Taliban-Land"
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/116512/ann_jones_on_the_road_to_taliban_land
"We
know many faces have come
through here over 30 years...the question we have to answer to you is
how we are
different." –
Captain Sean Dynan to village
elders, Kandahar Province, , 24th MEU, PBS report “The Forgotten War.”
“19-year-old
Jaan Agha in Helmund Province told the Institute for War and Reporting
in
November of 2007 that it was either the Taliban
or watch his family starve. "I
couldn't find a job anywhere. So I had to join the Taliban. They
give me
money for my family expenditures. If I left the Taliban, what else
could I
do?" --“Few
Choices for Helmand’s Troubled Youth,” Institute for War and Peace
Reporting,
Nov. 9, 2007
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=340496&apc_state=henh
Exhibit
B: Sources and Links
"Drought
and Hunger Kill Nine
People in Northern Afghanistan," RAWA report, May 25, 2008
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/05/25/drought-and-hunger-kill-nine-people-in-northern-afghanistan_8494.html
“Children Eating Grass, Ghazni,” IRIN News, March 10, 2008
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=77195
Combined
Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF101) Power and Water
Conference, an expert said:
http://www.aed.usace.army.mil/news/releases/CJTF101.pdf
“Guidebook
for Supporting Economic Development in Stability
Operations,” says how important public relations can be, saying:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR633.pdf
"DACAAR trains 460 water and sanitation engineers from all over
Afghanistan"
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SODA-6PT325?OpenDocument
"AFGHANISTAN: Water a serious problem nationwide"
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=20150
“OXFAM
TO PRESIDENT OBAMA: NEW STRATEGY MUST AVERT A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN”
http://wap.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/220803/fe304c23953614463670db1992142e7f.htm
STATEMENT
OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KARL W.
EIKENBERRY, U.S. ARMY FORMER COMMANDING
GENERAL
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON
DEFENSE AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND
STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN, FEBRUARY 13, 2007,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC_Afghan021307/Eikenberry_Testimony021307.pdf