“A
25-year-old man we will call Shakir has
told IRIN he rues rejecting an offer of “work” from a Taliban agent
whereby he
would get 500 Afghanis (about US$10) a day for carrying out attacks on
government offices in Farah Province, southwestern Afghanistan.
Those who accepted the offer are better off,
he thinks. “People are jobless, hungry
and destitute so they agree to do anything for a small payment,” he
told IRIN,
refusing to give his name for fear the insurgents would kill him.”--“Afghanistan:
Tempted by a Taliban Job Offer,” IRIN News Agency, March 22,
2009
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83310
“Policemen
in Afghanistan are not happy with their lives. The highest-ranking
officer
makes about $80 per month, and "the Taliban pay better," one
policeman tells me. Would he go fight
with them? "They haven't asked me. But I have to survive. If they asked
me
I would," he replies.” --“Taliban
Threatens 'Grow Poppy or Die!,'”
Newsmax, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/11/16/162941.shtml?s=lh
"We
need to pay construction workers
more than the Taliban are paying their soldiers, fighters and porters,"
says Ostlund, putting porters' pay at about 100 dollars a month and
fighters'
at 150.”
--“Afghans Learning a Better
Way to Match
Taliban Pay,” AFP, March 23, 2008,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hsVZExc0XaqQlfKcSpcweL5SbIuA
“Joining
the Taleban gave
Mahmud a
chance to save up enough money to start his own small business.
Nowadays, he
buys goods in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah and sells them in the
districts at weekly "mila" or markets. "Now
that I have work, I am not with the
Taleban any more."” – “Few Choices for
Helmand’s Troubled
Youth,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Nov. 9, 2007
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=340496&apc_state=henh
"There
is a low
percentage
of the total Taliban force who we would
call ideologically driven. We refer to them as Tier 1 people who
believe their ideology, that what they're
doing is right. The vast majority of
Taliban fighters are essentially economically
disadvantaged young men."
--Col. Tom Collins, PBS Frontline, April 2,,, 2007,
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/interview_collins.html
"Most Afghans, after the
dispersal of the Taliban, were full of hope and ready to work. The
tangible
benefits of reconstruction --jobs, housing, schools, health-care
facilities
--could have rallied them to support the gooovernment and turn that
illusory
"democracy" into something like the real thing. But reconstruction
didn't happen." ---Journalist
Ann Jones, "The Road to Taliban-Land"
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/116512/ann_jones_on_the_road_to_taliban_land
“19-year-old
Jaan Agha in Helmund Province told the Institute for War and Reporting
in
November of 2007 that it was either the Taliban
or watch his family starve. "I
couldn't find a job anywhere. So I had to join the Taliban. They
give me
money for my family expenditures. If I left the Taliban, what else
could I
do?" --“Few
Choices for Helmand’s Troubled Youth,” Institute for War and Peace
Reporting,
Nov. 9, 2007
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=340496&apc_state=henh
"Drought
and Hunger Kill Nine
People in Northern Afghanistan," RAWA report, May 25, 2008
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/05/25/drought-and-hunger-kill-nine-people-in-northern-afghanistan_8494.html
“Children Eating Grass, Ghazni,” IRIN News, March 10, 2008
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=77195
Combined
Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF101) Power and Water
Conference
http://www.aed.usace.army.mil/news/releases/CJTF101.pdf
“Guidebook
for Supporting Economic Development in Stability
Operations”
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR633.pdf
"DACAAR trains 460 water and sanitation engineers from all over
Afghanistan"
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SODA-6PT325?OpenDocument
"AFGHANISTAN: Water a serious problem nationwide"
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=20150
“OXFAM
TO PRESIDENT OBAMA: NEW STRATEGY MUST AVERT A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN”
http://wap.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/220803/fe304c23953614463670db1992142e7f.htm
STATEMENT
OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KARL W.
EIKENBERRY, U.S. ARMY FORMER COMMANDING
GENERAL
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE ON
DEFENSE AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND
STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN, FEBRUARY 13, 2007,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC_Afghan021307/Eikenberry_Testimony021307.pdf