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The Avoidable War

By Ralph Lopez
August 10, 2009

(The author is co-founder of Jobs for Afghans, http://jobsforafghans.org.  He recently returned from Kabul.)

On a recent trip to Kabul for our non-profit organization, Jobs for Afghans, we made a startling discovery: there is no true Taliban insurgency.  Yes, there is a Taliban leadership, many of whom are "foreigners," meaning, non-Afghans.  Yes, there are many fighting-age men who fight because they are paid to do so, by the small cadre of Taliban and Al Qaeda commanders who have plenty of opium money.  They fork out the excellent wage in these parts of $8 per day for "insurgent work."  But a die-hard, dedicated army of fighters who pledge allegiance to the Taliban ideology and cause?  It's not there.  Even Vice President Joe Biden acknowledged last March in Brussels, "Roughly 70 percent are involved because of the money.”  And General Karl Eikenberry, former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said to Congress in 2007 "Much of the enemy force is drawn from the ranks of unemployed men looking for wages to support their families."

The dirty little secret is that the renewed insurgency could have been avoided.  The vast majority of Afghans still hate the Taliban.  They remember the days of heads and hands getting lopped-off in the National Stadium, and men flogged because their beards were not long enough.  No one is eager to see them return.  But in a nation with 40% unemployment, working for the Taliban is the only job in town.  As the saying goes, you might not like the work, but that's who's hiring.

How did we get to this pass?  Fighting a renewed insurgency 8 years after the Taliban government was soundly trounced, to the cheers of 90% of the population?  The first thing that happened was that, out of the relatively small amount of non-military assistance which was sent to rebuild this bombed-out place, almost half wound up as profits for big contractors like Dyncorp, Louis Berger Group, and KBR.  They were building substandard schools, roads, and clinics (with no doctors) when what the country needed was jobs, jobs, jobs.  Not fancy jobs.  Jobs paid in cash by the day or by the week, at less than $10 a day, clearing canals still clogged with debris, digging drainage ditch with shovels along miles of roads, and the countless ways men can be employed to keep their families from semi-starvation.  The UN says 35% of Afghans are malnourished.  You can't have business development if you don't have stability.  And you can't have stability when you have nearly half the work force unemployed.  Add to this the Taliban's willingness to pay $8 a day to those who will pick up a gun, and the renewed insurgency becomes a lot less of a mystery.

There are countless instances of Taliban fighters saying they will trade their guns for a job.  What makes this war even more senseless is how little it would cost to provide such jobs, say, for a year, to stabilize the country and allow the free market to flourish.  It would cost less than one-tenth of what we are spending now on military operations each year, which is running close to $50 billion.  Why is this approach not being talked about in Congress?  Call me cynical, but war is profitable.  The beauty of cost-plus, no bid contracting is hard to find in the normal business world.  

A widespread, stability-enhancing cash-for-work jobs program which would save the American taxpayer the hideous cost of war, both human and financial, can work in Afghanistan.  We saw such projects on a small scale.  Perhaps most telling are stories like Mahmud's, who told a reporter in Helmand that joining the Taleban gave him a chance to save up enough money to start his own small business, buying goods in Lashkar Gah and selling them in the district "mila" or markets.  Mahmud said "Now that I have work, I am not with the Taleban any more."  This situation is the true definition of insanity.  Top commander General Stanley McChrystal just said jobs could induce many Taliban to drop their weapons.  How many more of our soldiers must die before sense takes hold in the Obama administration?

(Ralph Lopez is co-founder of Jobs for Afghans, which is lobbying for cash-for-work jobs programs in Afghanistan in order to bring stability.  Ask your congressman to sponsor the Afghan Stabilization Act, by simply cutting and pasting this whole page into his or her email form HERE.    WWW.JobsForAfghans.org )

http://jobsforafghans.org/

Sources

 "McChrystal: Jobs could curb Taliban fighting"
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-08-09-mcchrystal-afghanistan_N.htm?csp=34#uslPageReturn

Mahmud: "Few Choices for Helmand’s Troubled Youth"
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=340496&apc_state=henh

"Contractors in Afghanistan are making big money for bad work"
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13518

"Ann Jones on the Road to Taliban Land"
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/116512/ann_jones_on_the_road_to_taliban_land

"Children Eating Grass in Ghazni"
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=77195

"Afghanistan aid delivery shortfall a security risk"
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0326/p99s01-duts.htm

Starvation in Kandahar Province (video)
http://youtube.com/watch?v=wc6vfqdaRK8

35% of Afghans do not meet daily food requirement:
World Bank 2009 Interim Strategy Note
http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22216104~menuPK:305990~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html

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DRAFT LEGISLATION, JOBS FOR AFGHANS


H.R.  [number to be assigned by Clerk]

One Hundred Eleventh Congress  of the  United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on [DATE]

An Act

Making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2010, and for other purposes.

     Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following
sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and for
other purposes, namely:

Title: Afghanistan Stability Act of 2009

I.  For an additional amount for `Afghanistan Stability Fund'
$3,700,000,000 to remain available until September 30, 2010, for:

a) Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund of the
World Bank for publics works projects qualified by the Afghan Ministry
of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, in conjunction with the
Community Development Councils, which can be defined as "cash for
work."  Cash-for-work projects shall be defined as those which hire
exclusively Afghan labor, with small exceptions for consultative
overhead, which utilize labor-intensive methods for an overall rate of
70% of total project funding allocated to wages for line workers.

b)  Funding to be administered through USAID for cash-for-work
projects in zones deemed by ISAF to be relatively secure, to obviate
the need for high security overheads for project managers and
inspectors.  Priority shall be given to projects involving roads,
canalization water, irrigation, sanitation, and trash collection and
disposal.

c)   Cash-for-work projects shall have in place, at a minimum, a basic
audit trail for cash payments consisting of worker punch cards, which
included photos of workers, and field master lists of workers, signed
as a guarantee of receipt.

II.  This Act shall supersede previous legislation governing the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and allow blocks grants
of $100,000 denominated only in Afghanis to be available to US
commanders for cash-for-work projects meeting a no more than 10%
overhead threshold, measured as 90% of funds allocated to meeting
Afghan line worker payroll.

III. Projects funded by block grants authorized under the proposed
legislation shall participate in the new ARTF Incentive  program,
(established SY1387 (March 2009)), which will reward Afghan government
through additional financing for progress against annual benchmarks.
The benchmark in this case should be percentage of hiring goals
accomplished relative to targets.

IV.  No project funded by the Afghanistan Stability Act shall include
as a condition for participation that contractors be required to
participate in “post-battlefield clean-up.”